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Towards a Transcendental Philosophy of Spatiality: Husserl, Paliard, and Deleuze on Non-Extensional Spaces

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ABSTRACT

This essay will explore the constitution of a transcendental theory of space through an examination of the notion of spatial synthesis in the works of Husserl, Paliard, and Deleuze. First, we shall explore the constitution of the sensorial fields in Husserl's phenomenology. In Husserlian terms, space is not originally an empty form that can eventually be filled with a certain empirical content. Accordingly, the philosopher claims that spatiality is a consequence of the immanent synthesis of sensations. Then, we will move on to Jacques Paliard's psychology of perception, where we will find both aesthetic and noetic synthesis as transcendental conditions for the perception of space. Lastly, we will explore Deleuze's theory of intensive space, specifically the concept of depth developed in a dialogue with Paliard. This comparative analysis shows that purely intensive fields of individuation are a transcendental a priori for the perception of an extensive space.

KEYWORDS

Space; Synthesis; Husserl; Paliard; Deleuze

Introduction

What are the conditions of our perception of extension? How does the organization of space work? What is the nature of the processes involved in every spatial intuition? These questions and others in the same vein inform a transcendental approach to the experience of spatiality. In this paper we will explore this perspective through an examination of the notion of spatial synthesis in the works of Husserl, Paliard, and Deleuze.

One of the main aspects of transcendental meditation for Deleuze is that it must avoid the use of empirical notions to characterize transcendental conditions. There must be a difference in nature between the transcendental and empirical fields. In other words, the transcendental philosopher ought to distinguish carefully between the conditions and the conditioned. The main consequence for a transcendental philosophy of space is that the category of *extension* will not be a part of the transcendental field. That is why the notion of non-extensional spaces is key as a first approach for this investigation. To determine this concept in the most precise way possible, we will show, first, the main features of extensive space.

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Extensionality is a property of space in the usual meaning of the word. First of all, we can say that an object is spatially extended inasmuch as it has three dimensions: height, depth, and breadth. As we will see in the next section, objects of perception are the kind of objectivities that should be primarily considered as extensional. However, the scope of the concept is not limited to the things of immediate experience. As Husserl shows in §9 of *Crisis,* the objective space of modern physics, which results from the application of pure mathematics to the intuitively given nature, preserves the extensional character of the spatiality on which it is based. This is because mathematical idealization disregards the qualitative properties of things, but it leaves intact their spatial shape and thus their extensional character (Husserl 1970, 38). Objective space, thus, is not only abstract but also homogeneous and measurable. It is said that a space is homogeneous when any of its points are interchangeable with one another. Such interchangeability between places depends on the fact that objective space is not oriented – that is, there is no privileged point around which an orientation can be established. Since it is homogeneous, objective space can be measured. Husserl finds that the practical art of measuring enables a new kind of inductive prediction: "one can 'calculate' with compelling necessity, on the basis of given and measured events involving shapes, events which are unknown and were never accessible to direct measurement" (33). As a consequence of this unlimited extension of calculus, objective space becomes infinite. When Deleuze uses the concept of extension, he seems to have all these aspects in mind. In his account of Deleuze's philosophy of space, Manuel DeLanda says that the main characters of extensive magnitudes are that, given their homogeneity, they are additive and divisible, and that an extensive space can be measured and identified by its limits or frontiers. This means that, in a philosophy of difference like that of Deleuze, extension defines the space of identity (DeLanda 2005, 80–81). This brief reference should be sufficient in order to consider that extensionality seems to be a property of empirical space, whether a lived or objective one.

In search of a positive determination of transcendental space we find synthetic processes. For Husserl this means that the perception of space is the result of an immanent synthesis of sensations, which will be explored in the next paragraph. While the Husserlian transcendental field is presented as two-dimensional, we will see that Paliard's theory of perception revolves around the vision of depth. The second section will be devoted to showing how the conditions for the visual perception of space have, for this author, both an aesthetic and a noetic value. We will then see that, when thinking about the conditions of the perception of extension in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze puts forth a synthetic movement based on Jacques Paliard's concepts of *implicit thought*, *depth,* and *distance*. As a consequence of this, he offers a positive definition of non-extensional spaces: those spaces must be thought of as intensive fields of individuation.

Husserl: Sense-fields and Associative Syntheses

According to the main direction of Husserlian analysis, the problem of the constitution of space can be considered from two complementary perspectives. On the one hand, the static studies attempt to describe the essential notes of the Noetic–Noematic correlation, as it is actually presented to the phenomenologist. The essences obtained by means of the "eidetic variation" thus refer not only to the noematic pole of the correlation – in our

case, the space as it is actually experienced – but also to the noetic processes involved in such an experience. Since these constitutive operations are the condition of the possibility of space, static analysis leads to a transcendental consideration of spatiality, which is centered in the relationship between kinesthetic sensations and their correlative sense-fields. On the other hand, the genetic investigation also seeks to display the essential structures of consciousness and its objective correlate; but, unlike static analyses, it is not focused in the present but in the history of consciousness itself or, in Husserl's words, in "how consciousness arises out of consciousness" (Husserl 1998, 150). Therefore, if the static perspective exhibits the transcendental role of sensation in the constitution of space, a genetic inquiry would try to show how these very sensations are constituted by virtue of passive syntheses, which operates beneath the egological consciousness. Nonetheless, and despite the different perspectives, Husserlian phenomenology is meant to be a scientific method; and this means, primarily, that it ought to deal with essences or *eidos* and not merely with empirical phenomena. In this context, Husserl distinguishes the empiric intuition, which is related to sensible objects, from a non-sensuous intuition, which, although it is founded in sensible perception, enables the experience of ideal objects. Unlike sensible perception, *eidetic insight* (*Wesenserschauung*) can only deliver an intuition of essences by virtue of an imaginative free variation method that aims to isolate what is universal and invariant in the phenomenon in question, that is, its essence. Either way, however, the following analysis will show that extensional space – the space that is actually experienced as an intrinsic character of transcendent objects – is founded in a transcendental field that cannot be described, strictly speaking, in extensional terms.

However, what does "spatial extension" mean in a technical sense? In *Ideas II* Husserl affirms: "By the term spatial (better: corporeal) extension of a thing we understand the *spatial corporeality* pertaining to its concrete essential content exactly the way it belongs to this content in full determinateness" (Husserl 1989, 32). That is to say that every corporeal modification (change in form or position) involves a change in extension. Accordingly, Husserl considers that extension is not a mere piece of space insofar as the objective space – of physics, for instance – is absolutely fixed: neither space itself nor any of its pieces can move or be empty (32). Things in space, by contrast, are extension (primary quality) filled up by modifying sensuous or *real* qualities (secondary quality). According to this, extension is not a *real* property of things (such as color, weight, or smell) but rather an essential form of all real properties. In this sense, extension is the essential characteristic of materiality (34).

At this point it is important to notice that we are considering things in abstraction of the causal connection in which they are actually involved as material beings. Husserl distinguishes, in this context, three levels of foundation in the ontology of things: 1. as a real event, taken in its fully causal connection (*res materialis*); 2. as a spatial phenomenon only (*res extensa*); 3. as an immanent phenomena (*res temporalis*). Here we will concentrate on the relationship between *res extensa* and *res temporalis*, in order to show how spatial phenomena are founded ultimately in the syntheses of sensations that take place in the immanence of consciousness (26). In addition to that, we will also restrict our analysis to visual spatiality, by putting into brackets other spatial dimensions, such as the tactual aspect of things. As a consequence of this methodological abstraction, the real things are reduced to a "spatial phantom." Husserl writes:

> Already in the constitution of sensed spatial something as such, even if it be only a pure visual spatial phantom (a form fulfilled purely by color, not only without relation to the tactual and other data of the other senses, but also without any relation to the moment of "materiality" and thereby to any real-causal determinations), we have a formation of a hidden, analytically exhibitable, constitutive synthesis. (23–4)

From a noematic perspective, the extensional character of spatial phantoms is closely bound with the inadequate givenness of external objects. In other words, transcendent objects reveal themselves throughout a manifold of *adumbrations* or *profiles* (*Abschattungen*), each of which presents the same intended object – as long as the noematic sense remains unchanged. For this reason, objects possess an ideal character insofar as they reveal themselves in a series of different adumbrations that converge on an identical point – a pure identical X –, which is never given materially. Consequently, adumbrations are *appearances* (*Apparenz*) of an ideal object. Adequate givenness, thus, is an ideal pole that involves an infinite experience. The same consideration can be expressed in noetic terms by pointing out that the act of perception implies a perspective inasmuch as it is always oriented by the lived-body. Accordingly, external perception involves two kinds of intentional acts: *presentations* that show the sides of the object that are sensorily given, and *appresentations* that intend the sides that are co-presenting but not materially given and which, therefore, constitute the empty horizon of the object. Husserl also finds that the movement of my lived-body necessarily motivates changes in the appearances in which an object is given. Therefore, if we want to clarify the "if–then" character of perceptual experience, we need to elucidate both poles of this intentional correlation: the kinestheses and their correlative sense-fields.

Kinestheses are sensations by which a subject is aware of movements on and in its body. As sensation, they are not located in space – as are the body movements themselves – but rather in the flow of consciousness; this is to say that sensations are, primarily, *res temporalis*. In contrast to the sensations that constitute the qualitative content of spatial phantoms (*Datenempfindung*), kinesthetic sensations provide information about the *form* and *position* of spatial objects (*Stellungsempfindung*). Now then, kinestheses – and sensations in general – are not atomistic phenomena but rather they configure a system of sensations. The noematic correlation of kinesthetic systems taken as a whole is the system of appearances of things (Claesges 1964, 65). However, and according to the abstractive procedure that characterizes static analysis, Husserl distinguishes between different layers of kinesthetic systems, each of which has, as its noematic correlate, a sense-field of increasing complexity. The simplest and most fundamental kinesthetic system is the so-called *oculomotor system* that comprehends *sensu stricto* only the movements of the eyes. The noematic correlation of the oculomotor system is the *enclosed oculomotor field* (*Geschlossene okulomotorische Feld*), which constitutes the most elementary form of locative organization of sensation. In this context, Husserl holds that: "The oculomotor field is bidimensional" (Claesges 1964, 87). That is to say that the simplest visual field is formally ordered in two axes: right and left and up and down. It also admits a distinction between a *central area* (*Zentralgebiet*), which is the focus of attention, and which is characterized by its clarity and distinction, and an *outer area* (*Außergebiet*), which refers to the empty horizons that surround the visible area.

Although the oculomotor field is a locative formal structure that primarily orders the system of visual sensations, it is not yet space in the fullest sense of the concept but it is rather "analogous to space" (*Raumanalog*) (Claesges 1964, 82). In other words, the bidimensional field constitutes the transcendental condition of the possibility of space, insofar as it formally organizes sensations in the immanence of consciousness. However, it lacks some of the key features of spatiality in the normal sense of the word; first and foremost, the oculomotor field does not possess the three dimensions that define extensional space; that is, "extensional" means "corporeal," as we have seen above. In this sense, Husserl claims that the immanent field gains depth by means of two convergent procedures. On the one hand, the binocular eye movements allow modification of the focal distance by virtue of changes in the point of convergence between the axis of each eye. On the other hand, the displacement of the lived-body – taken as an absolute zero-point of orientation – offers to the oculomotor field a proper orientation system through the differentiation between a *near world* (*Nahwelt*) and a *distant world* (*Fernwelt*). With the addition of the axis near-far, the visual field obtains depth and, therewith, it can properly be considered space. In summary, the static analyses discussed so far show that space is founded, ultimately, in an immanent sense-field. Nonetheless, the constitution of sensation itself was not taken into account by the static perspective. And that is, precisely, one of the essential goals of the Husserlian genetic analyses.

In the volume *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, Husserl offers a more comprehensive study on the genetic constitution of sensations. Particularly, the formation of hyletic unities lies on two levels of passive syntheses: the temporal synthesis and the associative syntheses. Regarding temporal consciousness, a multiplicity of sensible data is unified in each living present by the "all-encompassing forms of coexistence and succession" (Husserl 2001, 184). Accordingly, all sensible data are synthetized, irrespective of their qualitative contents, inasmuch as they coexist in each streaming present. Nevertheless, coexistence in the present is a necessary but not sufficient condition for hyletic constitution, as long as temporal synthesis is not "a form of order" of what is given simultaneously (186). In order to establish differences within the content of each present, Husserl proposes a higher-level synthesis specifically oriented towards the hyletic multiplicity. In this sense, associative syntheses unify the *prominent* (*abgehoben*) elements of each coexistence configuration in accordance with the general principles of *resemblance* (*Ähnlichkeit*), *contrast* (*Kontrast*) or *dissimilarity* (*Nichtähnlichkeit*) and *contiguity* (*Kontiguität*).

Unlike the empirical association between transcendent objects – that is, between objects already constituted – immanent resemblance produces a "real" synthesis of their elements (175). In other words, immanent unities are constituted as such by virtue of their resemblance. This is why Husserl also considers that associative syntheses are transcendental. He writes: "The rubric 'association' characterizes for us a form and a lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general; but it does not characterize, as it does for psychologists, a form of objective, psychophysical causality" (162). Now then, relations of resemblance possess an intrinsic gradualness ranging from total equality to complete dissimilarity. In accordance with that, if the resemblance reaches a maximum level, then the elements fuse (*verschmelzen*) together in a new unity as a result of their homogeneity.

The relation of contrast is the complementary condition of a fusion of homogeneity (*Homogenitätsverschmelzung*), inasmuch as the associative synthesis unifies elements that are prominent, precisely because of their contrast with the background. If the fusion by resemblance constitutes the inner consistency of immanent unities, the relation of contrast shapes the external horizon from which immanent unities stand out. Hence, the primordial phenomena of fusion and contrast configure the Husserlian version of the distinction figure/ground emphasized by the Gestalt psychology. Husserl also mentions that temporal contiguity serves as a third principle for associative syntheses. Thus, every prominent datum is constituted as an enduring phenomenon: beginning, lasting a while, and ceasing (186). Therefore, each prominent unity has in itself an inner synthetic structure, since it is in itself a continuity of sequence. This inner continuity is the foundation of a continual fusion with respect to content, which Husserl calls "fusion at-close-proximity" (187). However, since prominent elements also establish relations of resemblance despite their discontinuity, a "fusion-at-a-distance" – together with the fusion at-close-proximity – organizes a configuration of sensations in each present (185).

In general terms, passive syntheses follow a gradual path from the general to the particular. The primary condition of the constitution of sensation is the temporal synthesis, which unifies sensations solely on the ground of their simultaneity (184). On the basis of the all-encompassing forms of coexistence and succession, the syntheses oriented towards hyletic content constitute "unitary sense-fields," by means of the fusion among sensations of the same kind:

> Everything in a present that is prominent and at the same time homogeneous is connected. Accordingly, every sense-field is a unitary field for itself: Everything visual is connected through visual homogeneity, everything tactile through tactile homogeneity, everything acoustic through acoustic homogeneity, *etc.* (184)

While the relation of contrast differentiates among distinct sense-fields, a fusion of homogeneity constitutes the inner consistency of each field by itself. Within each field, in turn, a relief is formed by virtue of the relation of "prominence under contrast" that takes place among unities of the same generic quality (186). And since the notion of relief possesses a relational character, elements within each sense-field constitute a multiplicity defined by a differentiation without opposition. Husserl states: "Each term of the multiplicity is a term for itself through contrast, but they are not opposed to each other; indeed, they are especially united with one another by a fusion without contrast" (185). In this sense, the relationship between the field and the unities can be thought in the light of the part-whole relations developed in the third of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (Holenstein 1972, 45). In addition to that, the immanent differentiation process leads to the problem of pre-predicative individuation.

Regarding this issue, Husserl points out that individuality should not be primarily defined by the specific essence of the object, whereby it is linked with other objects "generally and conceptually according to genus and species" (Husserl 2001, 192). By contrast, individuality – the "thisness" of an object – is already constituted by the convergence of temporal and local determinations (191). With regard to the former, temporal synthesis confers individuality in two ways. From a temporal viewpoint, an object is defined as a unity of duration, which constitutes what Husserl calls the "temporal shape" of the object (189). The temporal shape itself, in turn, occupies a unique position in universal time,

conceived here as "a local system built up out of single temporal loci" (190). That is to say that only "temporal position" gives individuality in the first place. In *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, Husserl affirms: "The same sensation now and in a different now possesses difference … that corresponds to the absolute temporal position; this difference is the primal source of the individuality of the 'this,' and thereby of absolute temporal position" (Husserl 1991, 68). The temporal position becomes absolute since the points of time are irreplaceably different (Husserl 2001, 190). Nevertheless, temporal individuation cannot establish differences among what is simultaneously given in every streaming present. In this sense, locality is what orders the coexistence peculiar to each sense-field, in accordance with the two-dimensional local system that characterizes immanent pre-spatiality (190). Therefore, each unity is localized in a unique position of its local field. Individuation, thus, occurs as a result of the immanent self-differentiation process that defines the transcendental constitution of sensations.

Paliard: Depth and Implicit Thought

While, as we have already seen, Husserlian transcendental conditions of space are bidimensional, it is precisely by means of an analysis of the perception of *depth* that Paliard constructs his theory of vision. His book *Pensée implicite et perception visuelle*, published in 1949, can be read as a systematic development of a non-extensive space presented as a transcendental condition of perception. Its main thesis is that there is an *implicit thought* in visual perception. Paliard is emphatic in pointing out that this particular *thought* is not a separate faculty but an immanent condition of vision as such. It commands a multiplicity of perceptive syntheses as a sort of "already there" of the spirit, a logic of pure vision. Paliard deduces this noetic dimension from numerous experiences and multiple points of view, from scientific experiments in psychology and ophthalmology to poetic and even autobiographical experiences.

The book starts with a childhood memory. While contemplating a prairie, the boy Paliard used to be amazed at the fact that so many things could fit in only one gaze and that "so many thoughts were enveloped in one" (Paliard 1949, 3). This early experience showed the way for his thought: the perception of depth and distance seemed to express a complexity of vision which remains concealed in everyday life, most of the time involved in habit, action, and reaction. There seems to be a rich *interior* of the perception of exteriority, which Paliard aims to uncover. The first step to do so is a distinction between practical and contemplative perception. From the first point of view, visual perception is always subordinated to touch and action. In practical life vision prepares the field for action and is an anticipation of it. But this practical anticipation can sometimes relax, and when "the screw of vital demands is loosened," practical life gives way to contemplative perception (7). The direct preparation for action is replaced now by the long and winding ways of contemplative thought. This implicit spiritual structure of vision is better shown in the perception of *depth* and its relation with the judgment of *distance*, and there lies the next step for Paliard's investigation.

It is again through a childhood memory that Paliard poses the problem. At night, while looking at the prairie in the dark, some fireplaces started burning here and there. The spots of light brightened some points, but a global darkness was still predominant. The child was then surprised at how difficult it was to know the exact distance of those

points of light. It was almost impossible to guess the location of those fires with only the help of distant vision in the dark, a judgment relatively easy to make during daytime. The first thing to say here is that, initially, the perception of distance can only be that of a movement traversing it. It then involves what Husserl called kinestheses. According to Paliard, the perception of depth is only a resumption of that movement, and it is due to the muscle memory active in vision that this spatial organization takes place. Since depth is a global organization of space, the eye needs more than a few visible dots of light to configure the whole frame. More visible lines are needed to activate the muscle memory, which can be thought of as a passive synthesis (although Paliard does not use this concept) immanent to the exercise of vision. The visual frame of depth is then, in the first place, the result of a synthesis of past contemplations and embodied experiences of space which constitutes the first layer of thought implicit in visual perception.

This *implex*, as Paliard calls the *implicit thought*, is formed by the conjunction of the idea of distance and a multiplicity of evocative signs that arise from the spectacle. It is, as Paliard says, a law of the frame that goes into the spectacle itself, at the same time transcendent and immanent to it (Paliard 1949, 11). On the one hand, those evocative signs are what constitute the global effect of *depth*; on the other hand, these signs would not be what they are if the idea of *distance* had not been already there, as if acting from the back of the eye. This suggests that there are at least two sides of the *implex*: a latent gnoseology and a spontaneous aesthetics. In visual perception we encounter "not only an aesthetic value of suggestion but already a noetic value" (10).

Muscle memory of the past and the evocative signs entangled in actual perception are the main source of a spontaneous aesthetic constitutive of depth, "the synthetic affirmation of a visible universe" (46). On the other side of the relation, the latent noetic is presented as a multiplicity of relations of distance and suggestions enveloped in the perception of depth. That is why the two aspects of *implicit thought* can be presented in yet another way: the *enveloping* depth and the *enveloped* relations of distance (46). These two sides form an implicit knowledge that is independent of conscience and subjective intention. But let us not forget that this is a theory of vision and not of knowledge. This noetic value is intrinsic only to the visual perception of space and has nothing to do with understanding as a separate faculty. It is presented as a kind of "awakening of the order of knowing in the act of seeing" (15).

This order of visual knowledge is structured in a complex and changing relation of implicit judgments that Paliard calls "equilibriums of implication" (14-45). These prejudicative judgments are based upon the idea of *size* (*grandeur*), which is the idea of *existence* as applied to a particular object – that is, the spontaneous idea that things exist outside of our minds. *Size*, as an idea included in the noetic side of the implicit thought alongside the ideas of distance, existence, and site, is modulated in three aspects: "sensible size," which is the element that fills the visual field as a pure matter of gaze; "apparent size," which is included in the recognition of an object by the subject; and "real size," which is the implicit thesis of an objective dimension of existence (16-17). Each one of these aspects is the object of an implicit judgment. The equilibriums of implication are the ever-changing relations between these sketches of thought, a relatively unstable dimension that forms a noetic field for the perception of distance and depth. For instance, while in close vision, apparent and real size tend to coincide, they usually differ in distant vision. In this simple and usual case, implicit thought needs to

make the adjustment in order to constitute recognition. These judgments are an essential part of every perception of space, but it is through an analysis of depth that they come to the fore. Now we still need to ask, then, how exactly can we think of *depth* in itself? As we saw in this paragraph, Paliard offers some important elements to answer this question, but his interest lies elsewhere. For him, the perception of depth is a means to the end of developing a theory of vision. It is Deleuze who transforms *depth* into an ontological concept while developing the synthesis of the sensible, and that is where our investigation is headed in the next section.

Deleuze: Intensive Space as Transcendental Depth

Deleuze's philosophy of spatiality is developed in chapter five of *Difference and Repetition*. Paliard is an essential source of that theory precisely when Deleuze proposes the concept of depth (*profondeur*) as a transcendental field. This field is presented as a possible positive answer for the kind of spatiality we are looking for: non-extensive space is presented as intensive.

The whole chapter revolves around the concept of *intensity* as both the genetic element of extensive space and that which can only be felt in a transcendent exercise of sensation. That is why Deleuze goes from the perception of extension to its ontological aspect, which takes the form of a fundamental synthesis of space. In an evident resonance with Paliard's thought, Deleuze says that this is a synthesis of *implication*, or "a pure *implex*" (Deleuze 1994, 229). A theory of perception like Paliard's is relevant for Deleuze since it is precisely through sensation that one can have an experience of this *noumenon*. This is a peculiar kind of sensation that dissolves the conscious subject and gives an experience of an element that is insensible for common sense but can only be felt through a transcendent exercise of sensibility (138-145). Empirical use of sensibility corresponds to the logic of recognition, which Deleuze thinks as a concordant exercise of the faculties in which sensibility is bonded with imagination, memory, and understanding in the action of determining the form of objects for a constituted subject. Transcendent exercise, on the other hand, occurs when an encounter with a paradoxical "thing" takes place, something that cannot be recognized and therefore breaks the tranquility of common sense and active recognition. This "something" is then insensible for representative thinking; it can only be felt – and not imagined or remembered or understood – without being recognized as a neat form of object. We can interpret that, when speaking about the margin of indetermination of depth and the suggestive and evocative character of its components in implicit thought, Paliard has something of that sort in mind. For Deleuze, this "something" is what forces us to think through a sensible violence that forces perception to its limit. This element that "hurts" the sensibility of the common sense is what Deleuze calls "intensity": a purely *sensible* implicated in every extension, "the noumenon closest to the phenomenon" (222).

This is where Deleuze makes the leap from the theory of perception to ontology. In effect, the experience of intensity, as presented in chapter three of *Difference and Repetition,* prepares the way for the theory of depth as an intensive field of individuation in chapter five. The problem developed by Deleuze in that chapter is not only that of the genesis of phenomena but also, more importantly, the genesis of individuation in extensive space.

Extensional space can be recognized through its organization in three dimensions: "as right and left in the first dimension, as high and low in the second, and as figure and ground in the homogenized third … , which are like the dissymmetrical marks of its own origin" (Deleuze 1994, 229). Deleuze makes a sharp distinction between "ground" (*fond*) as the third dimension of extensive space and "depth" (*profondeur*) as its intensive origin. We could say that the perception of the *fond* as developed with Paliard gives way to the thought of the *profondeur* as proposed by Deleuze. Understood in this way, intensive depth is a synthetic process constitutive of a transcendental spatiality. Deleuze also calls this intensive field a pure *spatium* that must be carefully distinguished from empirical *extensio*.

Giving Paliard's theory an ontological reach, Deleuze characterizes *depth* as an enveloping intensity forming fields of individuation. This field is like a fountain of energy for every individual, like a shadow around every object; it is also the space from which the object arises, its source of individuality. This enveloping depth is closely related with a second type of intensity: enveloped distances. These distances are intensive inasmuch as they form a plane of asymmetrical relations that traverse the fields of individuation as pure embryonic movements and potential energy. Together, these two kinds of intensities constitute the *individuating factors* that give birth to qualified extensities in the empirical field. Typically using embryology as inspiration, Deleuze uses the image of the egg to give an account of this field of individuation as formed by intensive distances, gradients, and forced movements that can only take place in a formless and elastic plane. *Intensity*, as a physical but not extensive element, is then the true element of transcendental spatiality in Deleuze's philosophy.

The fold between *depth* and *distance* includes yet another two fundamental features that resonate with what we saw in Husserl and Paliard: the non-extensive space has both a temporal and a logical aspect. Let us take a look at the first feature. *Depth* is a spatial synthesis parallel to the second synthesis of time. In this regard, Deleuze says that as a shadow embracing every object, this intensive envelope is a testimony of the most distant past (Deleuze 1994, 230). That is to say that a part of what is enveloped in *depth* is the synthesis of *pure past* that operates as a ground for the passing presents in Deleuze's theory of time. This is not a psychological past but an ontological one, a past that was never a present because it is the virtual double of each actuality. This pure past is contemporary with every *now* in the same way as intensive depth is implicated in every *here*.

We said that the field of individuation also has a logical aspect. This leads us to what might be considered the deepest relation of Deleuzian ontology, one that he presents as the "strangest alliance, that between Being and itself in difference" (231). This alludes to the knot between the two faces of the transcendental field: the intensive and the virtual. In effect, the enveloped and enveloping movement of intensities fulfill an essential role in *expressing* the ideal relations of the virtual (Deleuze 1994, 252–253).[1] This ideal structure, which Deleuze deploys in chapter four of *Difference and Repetition*, is a problematic coexistence of purely differential elements, differential relations between those elements, and ideal singularities or events. Together they constitute the static genesis of all there is and the virtual form of change. It can be understood as the pure form of time (Hughes

[1]For a comprehensive reading of the ideal synthesis of difference through its mathematical sources, see Santaya 2017. For an account of the expressive relation between intensities and Ideas, see Bowden 2017.

2009, 125). When actualized by a field of individuation, these coexisting elements are in a way separated and put in intensive, dynamic relations which constitute a new type of distinction (Deleuze 1994, 252). Now we leave the *distinct* but *obscure* zone of the virtual and we enter the *clear* and *confused* plane of intensity. The enveloping depth gives birth to a *clear* expression of some Ideas while the enveloped distances constitute a *confused* expression of all the rest. As we said, then, every extensive space is endowed by an intensive shadow that is the source of its individuality. Now we have to add that this shadow, the synthesis of depth, expresses the plane of the virtual as a kind of nebular space of purely ideal relations and events.

Non-extensive spatiality as *depth* includes in Deleuze's thought, then, at least four folded elements, each of which constitute a type of multiplicity: enveloping intensities as fields of individuation; enveloped distances as sources of individuality; pure past as its temporal side; and the virtual realm as its expressive aspect.

Conclusion

We started asking about the conditions of our perception of extension and how the organization of space works. Three authors guided us in the development of this problem. We have found several crossing paths between those philosophers, and also some points of tension or even disagreement. The first thing that stands out is a common ground in transcendental method. Although Paliard does not present his philosophy as a transcendental one, his practice converges with those of Husserl and Deleuze in what matters for us: the search for the conditions of perception and the difference in nature between those conditions and the conditioned. In each of these three cases, though still with notable differences, it can be said that this problem is developed through a kind of logic of sensation resolved in a theory of individuation – individuation of the object in Husserl, of the landscape in Paliard, and of Being in Deleuze.

A second thing that stands out revolves around the concept of *multiplicity*, explicitly essential in the philosophies of both Husserl and Deleuze, but also at work in the background of Paliard's theory. In that regard, the three philosophers propose multiple planes that serve as conditions, and each of those planes is in itself a kind of multiplicity with its own logic. The confrontation with non-extensional spaces as a transcendental plane opens up a multi-layered field of temporal, noetic, sensible, semiotic, intensive, and virtual multiplicities; and, to say the least, this list remains open. In the three philosophies of space we have studied, the processes involved in the organization and interaction between these transcendental multiplicities are put together by a complex structure of synthesis.

Apart from the transcendental method and the role of multiplicity, there is a third subject that needs to be addressed in this conclusion: the concept of *depth*, apparently absent from Husserl's approach and essential to Paliard and even more so in Deleuze. It is in fact the latter that offers an important distinction between *extensive depth* (*fond*) as the third dimension of extension and *intensive depth* (*profondeur*) as a transcendental space. Deleuze finds that both the aesthetic and the noetic side of Paliard's *implicit thought* constitute an essential part of this intensive depth. Now, what can we say about Husserl's two-dimensional plane which apparently excludes a consideration of depth? Maybe the notion of *relief* can serve as a key to a phenomenological approach to something

analogous to Deleuze's intensive space. As a matter of fact, Husserl uses the term "intensity" to describe the relief immanent to each sense-field (Husserl 2001, 188).

A fourth problem arises when we think about the ontological reach of these investigations. The comparative analysis of our three authors shows a clear divergence on this subject. While Paliard explicitly refuses to engage in ontological speculation and talks about a mere "functional relation" that he aims to study (Paliard 1949, 14), both Husserl and Deleuze think of their theories as ontologies, although very different ones. The key word here is "immanence," which means "immanence to conscience" in Husserl and "immanence in itself" for Deleuze. While, in Deleuzian terms, ontology is explicitly defined as a pre-individual and a-subjective transcendental plane, the noetic pole of the intentional correlation is always subjective. This is why, probably, Husserl rejects consideration of depth as a primordial determination of the constitutive sense-fields, since that would imply the assertion that there are "corporeal" contents in the immanence of consciousness. In this context, the distinction between *intensive* and *extensive depth* comes to the front once again.

Lastly, in our analyses we found that non-extensional spaces were identified with the transcendental structure of space. However, does it mean that non-extensional spaces are, by essence, transcendental? This is a relevant question if we think that one of the main purposes of this essay is to widen the concept of space by means of a consideration of non-extensional spatialities. We pursue that aim through an inquiry focused on the constitution of space. Nonetheless, another line of research – of a topological scope, for instance – could show other non-extensional dimensions of space, which are not to be confused with the transcendental structures studied here.

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